Top-Down Peacemaking, Bottom-Up Peace 1. - 1. Regional Stabilization in International Relations Theory 18 . - 2. Franco-German Peacemaking after World War II 34. - 3. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 63 . - 4. The Israeli-Jordanian Treaty 87 . - 5. Other Twentieth-Century Cases 108 . - Peacemaking between Regional Rivals: Theoretical and Policy Implications 135
Domestic opinion and democratic foreign security policy -- The domestic decision-making environments of Great Britain, France, and the United States after two World Wars -- The post-World War I settlement, 1919 -- The post-World War II settlement, 1945-1954 -- Structural autonomy and democratic foreign security policy
Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.
This article summarizes the findings of my current research on successful peace agreements between regional rivals and offers policy recommendations that third-party states and institutions can follow to promote regional peacemaking. Based on detailed primary and secondary source analysis of three successful peace agreements between regional antagonists -- France and Germany after World War II, Egypt and Israel in 1978-79, and Israel and Jordan in 1994 -- I concluded that peacemaking is a two-staged process. The first stage, the transition process, is driven by a statist logic. Adapted from the source document.
This article criticises the traditional realist distinction between "high politics" (sovereignty and security matters) and "low politics" (economics and other "less important" state activities) on several grounds. First, it ignores the economic underpinnings of military power and national security. Second, it overestimates the independence states have both from the international economy and from domestic political opposition when mobilizing economic resources in support of security objectives. Finally, it glosses over the potential for states to achieve national security objectives in an interdependent world economy by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. This article, therefore, makes the case for treating the political economy of national security as a distinct subfield of security studies for both teaching and research purposes. It identifies a unique set of "political economy" issues that have a direct bearing on national security calculations. It reviews both the classical geopolitics literature and a growing literature by contemporary international relations scholars that address these issues in an effort to bridge the chasm between political economy and security. Finally, it suggests avenues of further research to flesh out the conditions under which domestic and international economic factors affect the pursuit of national security.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 121, Heft 3, S. 509-510
La décennie Mulroney présente des conditions qui ont amené le gouvernement conservateur à modifier considérablement ses orientations de politiques et, à cet égard, le secteur de la défense a probablement été plus affecté que tout autre. Le gouvernement a d'abord présenté une politique ambitieuse énoncée dans un Livre blanc et qui avait pour but de combler le fossé grandissant entre les engagements et les ressources affectées en matière de défense. Ce programme d'action a été conçu comme étant une réponse aux impératifs dictés par la guerre froide et par la relation inhérente du Canada avec les États-Unis. L'approche agressive du gouvernement dans sa politique de défense a toutefois vite été minée autant par la fin de la guerre froide que par les impératifs économiques et politiques intérieurs telle la réduction du déficit. En conséquence, les Conservateurs ont dû réduire considérablement leurs projets en matière de défense. Cet épisode suggère qu'à l'encontre de ce que l'on constate dans plusieurs autres secteurs, la redéfinition de l'espace en matière de défense est caractérisée par un resserrement important au cours des années Mulroney.